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ExperimentWe experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods
markets, where contractual incompleteness results from asymmetric information on the welfare maxi-
mizing quality of the goods. Our results suggest that tax evasion attempts – independently of whether
they are successful or not – lead to efﬁciency losses in the form of too low quality and less frequent
trade. Thus, shadow economies may reduce welfare not only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide
or to uncover taxable transactions, by imposing risk on uncertainty-averse tax evaders and by distorting
competition, but also by creating an additional efﬁciency loss in the underlying market by forfeiting pos-
sible gains from trade and by inducing insufﬁcient quality provision. We call these the hidden costs of tax
evasion.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Each year trillions of dollars slip through the tax authorities' ﬁngers
as a consequence of tax evasion. In the United States, for example, the
overall net tax gap in 2006was estimated to be approximately $385 bil-
lion (IRS, 2012). A substantial body of theoretical and empirical work –
brieﬂy discussed at the endof the introduction – addresses the problem,
focusing mainly on the determinants of the occurrence and the magni-
tude of tax evasion and on its welfare consequences. Considering the
government as a provider of public goods and services ﬁnanced by tax
revenues, tax evasion is detrimental to welfare for the simple reason
that it adds to the excess burden of taxation because some of the costs
of evasion are real resource costs and not just transfers (Feldstein,cs, University of Innsbruck,
43 512 507 7400.
rschbamer).
. This is an open access article under1995, 1999; Chetty, 2009).1 For instance, a real resource cost can
emerge when taxpayers try to conceal and tax authorities try to detect
tax evasion (see, e.g., Bayer, 2006), when tax evasion imposes uncer-
tainty on risk-averse evaders (Yitzhaki, 1987) and when tax-evading
ﬁrms drive tax-honest ones out of the market (Strand, 2005). In this
paper we argue that in markets where transactions are governed by
contractual incompleteness an additional welfare impact of attempted
and successful tax evasion might result from its effect on agents'
moral incentives of exploiting their informational advantage to their
beneﬁt and to the detriment of their trading partners, hence leading
to a substantial drop in overall efﬁciency.1 The standard thought experiment for the measurement of the excess burden of taxa-
tion is to calculate the net loss from raising the tax rate and returning the revenue lump
sum to the taxpayer. As Feldstein (1995, 1999) ﬁrst asserted, under some conditions the
‘tax-base-elasticity’ (for the case of income taxation better known as the ‘elasticity of tax-
able income’) is a sufﬁcient statistic for themarginalwelfare loss of raising the tax rate (see
Saez et al., 2012, for a discussion). The tax-base-elasticity approach implicitly assumes that
– at the agent's optimal solution – the marginal social cost of reducing the tax base by a
dollar equals the tax rate for all behavioral responses intended to reduce the burden of tax-
ation. As Slemrod (1998) and Chetty (2009) have convincingly argued, for tax evasion as
the behavioral response this assumption is likely to be violated in practice because some of
the private costs of evasion are transfers rather than real resource costs.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
4 While in the context of our experiment – where the tax receipts are contributed to a
public good which beneﬁts all subjects – the link between being a tax evader and being
an anti-social agent seems natural, this link might be less apparent in reality. Indeed, as
one of the anonymous referees pointed out, in countries where the government is highly
corrupted, over-regulates themarket, or imposes too strongﬁscal pressure on citizens, tax
15L. Balafoutas et al. / Journal of Public Economics 129 (2015) 14–25Key to our argument is the observation that inmanymarkets the ap-
proval of both trading partners is needed to evade taxes.2 This coopera-
tive dimension of tax evasion implies that at some point the trading
partners have to reveal their preferences regarding tax evasion to each
other. In markets governed by incomplete contracts it seems plausible
that the revelation of an agent's attitude regarding tax evasion inﬂu-
ences the trading partner's sentiments towards the agent and therewith
the behavior in the underlying market.
Wewill experimentally investigate the impact of revealed intentions
regarding tax evasion on the performance of a market characterized by
incomplete contracts— a topic that has to the best of our knowledge not
yet been explored in the literature. The setting in our controlled labora-
tory experiment is a market for expert services — often also referred to
as a credence goodsmarket (see Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, for a
general framework and an overview of the theoretical literature).
Such markets are plagued by serious contractual incompleteness due
to superior information of the seller on the quality that yields the
highest surplus from trade. Prime examples are health services, where
the doctor knows better than the patient which disease the latter has
and which treatment is appropriate, and all kinds of repair services,
where the expert knows more about the type of service the item
needs than the owner. On top of the asymmetric information on the
welfare maximizing quality, in many markets for expert services there
is also asymmetric information on the quality provided. For instance,
in the market for medical services a patient might be unable to tell ex
post whether the injection he received contained a high-cost substance
or not. The informational asymmetries imply that complete contracts
are infeasible and open the door to a whole array of different types
of fraudulent behavior on the sellers' side, including overtreatment
(providing a higher quality than the surplus maximizing one),
undertreatment (choosing a quality that is insufﬁcient to satisfy the
consumer's needs), and overcharging (charging for a higher quality
than has been provided). Furthermore, anticipated fraud might lead
consumers to abstain from the market altogether, leading to further ef-
ﬁciency losses.3
Ourmain hypothesis is that the size of the efﬁciency losses resulting
from contractual incompleteness depends on the trading partners' re-
vealed intentions to evade taxes. On the one hand, a mutual agreement
to pay or to evade taxes can decrease the social distance between the
trading parties. Reduced social distance has been demonstrated to
lead to more cooperative behavior, for instance by Charness et al.
(2007) and Götte et al. (2012). Based on this evidence wewould expect
that agents behave nicer towards trading partners who reveal the same
attitude regarding tax evasion. In the casewhere amutual agreement to
pay taxes leads to nicer (i.e., more trustful or more trustworthy) behav-
ior we refer to this as the solidarity effect, while in the case where a mu-
tual agreement to evade taxes leads to nicer behavior we refer to a
conspiracy effect.
On the other hand, in constellations where one trading partner re-
veals the intention to pay while the other reveals the intention to
evade taxes each player might have negative emotions towards the
other, leading to less trustful and trustworthy behavior and thereby de-
creasing the efﬁciency of a transaction. We call this the punishment ef-
fect. Systematic differences in the market behavior of sellers in
different constellations of revealed intentions to evade taxes might2 This is not the case for all bilateral transactions, of course. For instance, in the case of
sales taxes or excise taxes, the sellermay provide a false invoice to the buyerwho remains
unaware that the tax is evaded.Whilewewill also study a situationwhere tax evasion can
be imposed unilaterally by the seller, our focuswill be on transactionswhere both partners
must agree to evade taxes.
3 Although standard theory assuming own-money-maximizing and risk-neutral prefer-
ences predicts low efﬁciency in markets governed by incomplete contracts, recent exper-
imental studies – by Dulleck et al. (2011) and Beck et al. (2013) for markets for credence
goods and by Huck et al. (2010, 2012, 2013) for markets for experience goods – have
shown that suchmarketswork considerably better than predicted, probably due to agents'
social preferences, as examined in Kerschbamer et al. (forthcoming).also arise if the revealed intentions to evade taxes are driven by prefer-
ences that also drive market behavior. For instance, it seems plausible
that more pro-social sellers are not only less inclined to evade taxes
but also less willing to defraud consumers.4 We call this the selection ef-
fect. Finally, differences in behavior may also be due to the sheer fact
that taxes are actually evaded in one but paid in another constellation,
which directly affects the resulting proﬁts from the transaction. We
call this the cake size effect. In addition to these direct effects an impact
on efﬁciency might also arise if sellers who reveal their willingness to
pay or to evade taxes are expected to be more or less likely to defraud
their consumers (because of the solidarity, conspiracy, punishment, se-
lection or cake size effect). Consumers may then bemore or less willing
to interact, producing a further impact on efﬁciency. Given all those ef-
fects it is not a priori clearwhether attempted or actual tax evasion has a
positive, negative, or no impact on the efﬁciency of the underlying
market.
To assess the empirical relevance of these effects we ran an experi-
ment with 248 subjects who were either in the role of a seller or a con-
sumer on a credence goods market. Our experiment involved three
treatments implemented in a between-subjects design. In our main
treatment, before any interaction could take place, both sellers and con-
sumers had to indicate whether they wanted to evade or to pay taxes.
Only when both parties to a potential trade agreed, taxes were evaded,
otherwise they were paid.5
The results of ourmain treatment suggest that revealed intentions to
evade taxes lead to efﬁciency losses of up to 50% of the available surplus,
independently ofwhether taxes are actually evaded or not. In the exper-
iment the drop in efﬁciency is driven by large differences in interaction
and undertreatment rates of up to 20 percentage points. In particular,
tax-honest consumers are much less likely to enter the credence
goods market if they know they will have to interact with a tax-
dishonest seller. Also, if a transaction takes place, the undertreatment
rate is higher when at least one of the agents has revealed the intention
to evade taxes than in constellations where both transaction partners
are tax honest.
Using control treatments to disentangle the various effects of re-
vealed intentions regarding tax compliance,weﬁndevidence for the ex-
istence of a solidarity effect between two tax-honest agents and a
conspiracy effect between two tax-dishonest agents, both leading to
less fraud when agents reveal the same tax attitude. We also ﬁnd
some limited evidence for the existence of a selection effect, with tax-
dishonest sellers being more likely to defraud their customers, but al-
most no evidence for the existence of a punishment effect or a cake
size effect.
Overall, our results suggest that tax evasion may reduce welfare not
only by inducing agents to incur costs to hide or to uncover taxable
transactions, by imposing risk on risk-averse tax evaders and by
distorting competition between tax-honest and tax-evading ﬁrms, but
also by creating an additional (‘hidden’) efﬁciency loss in the underlyingevasionmight be a natural, ethically acceptable behavior— see Schneider andEnste (2000,
p.108) for a discussion. This raises the question of how important the phenomena studied
here are for differentmarkets. Experimental evidence presented by Güth et al. (2005) sug-
gests that tax evasion decisions do not depend on whether tax receipts are redistributed
with overall efﬁciency gains or losses (the lattermimickingwaste or corruption in govern-
ment). Whether this ‘neutrality’ result extends to the present framework is an open ques-
tion and we consider it as important to examine this question in more depth in future
studies.
5 Note that in real markets differences in behavior between the taxed and the untaxed
sectormight also arise from differences in institutional consumer protection. For instance,
liability rulesmight only apply in the taxedbut not in the untaxed sector.Weabstract from
such differences to isolate the pure effect of collaborative tax evasion on the performance
of the market in which the transaction takes place.
6 In theory there exists a third type of fraudulent behavior, which is overtreatment. It oc-
curs whenever the expert provides the high quality to a consumer who has the minor
problem. When quality is not observed by the consumer – as it is the case in the games
we study in this paper – overtreatment is dominated for the seller in material terms by
overcharging. Taking into account moral incentives it might still become an issue if it is
morally less costly for the seller to charge the high price when the high quality service is
provided (even if the consumer does not need it). However, as the results presented by
Dulleck et al. (2011) suggest, this theoretical possibility is irrelevant in an experiment. This
is conﬁrmed in our results: From the 2480 caseswhere overtreatment is possible (because
the customer has the minor problem) the high quality is provided in only 58 cases.
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sufﬁcient quality in case of trade.While ourwork provides a ﬁrst indica-
tion of the existence of such a hidden cost of tax evasion, more work is
needed to obtain information on its determinants and empirical impor-
tance. Our hope is that the present paper stimulates further studies in
the lab and the ﬁeld addressing those questions.
Before turning to our game and the experiment we refer to related
literature, of which several strands are relevant. First, our study is relat-
ed to the literature on the economics of tax evasion in general (Andreoni
et al., 1998; Slemrod, 2007). A substantial body of theoretical and em-
pirical work addresses the problem, focusing mainly on the effects of
institutional remedies against tax evasion. The seminal work by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) models citizens' decisions about which
fraction of income to declare as a simple portfolio decision problem
and determines the effects of changes in exogenous factors such as tax
and penalty rates and the probability of detection. Later work – by
Yitzhaki (1979), Reinganum and Wilde (1985), and Alm et al. (1992),
for instance – reﬁnes the analysis of optimal taxation, again mainly fo-
cusing on the effects of changes in the institutional framework in
which tax evasion potentially occurs. The theoretical work is accompa-
nied by empirical studies analyzing ﬁeld data (see, e.g., Clotfelter, 1983;
Feinstein, 1991; Slemrod, 2007) aswell as by laboratory andﬁeld exper-
iments (Baldry, 1986, 1987; Torgler, 2002, 2004; Kleven et al., 2011).
None of these studies has investigated how attitudes towards tax eva-
sion might affect the behavior in markets with incomplete contracts.
More closely related to the present paper is the (scarce) literature on
the cooperative dimension of tax evasion. Early contributions are the
theoretical studies by Yaniv (1992), Boadway et al. (2002), and Chang
and Lai (2004), mainly focusing on the effects of exogenous changes
in either the probability of detection or the penalty in case of detection
on collaborative tax evasion.More recently, Kleven et al. (2009) show in
an agencymodel that collaborative tax evasion is fragile in the presence
of veriﬁable business records and many involved parties; and
Madzharova (2013) andNaritomi (2013) investigate empirically the ef-
fects of changing the incentives for collusive tax evasion on the produc-
er side (by changing the difference between the payroll tax rate and the
corporate income tax rate), or the consumer side (by giving monetary
rewards to consumers to ask for receipts). None of these studies ad-
dresses the question how revealed intentions to pay or evade taxes
might affect agents' moral incentives of exploiting their informational
advantage in markets governed by contractual incompleteness.
Regarding moral incentives in tax-related decisions our study is re-
lated to the literature studying the impact of non-standard preferences
on tax evasion decisions. For instance, Spicer and Becker (1980) study
the impact of fairness perceptions on this decision, Gordon (1989) in-
troduces a psychological cost of evasion, Erard and Feinstein (1994)
adapt the concepts of guilt and shame to the context of tax compliance,
Frey and Torgler (2007) study the impact of perceptions regarding
the compliance of other taxpayers on evasion, and Konrad and Qari
(2012) study the effect of patriotism on compliance. By contrast, our
focus is not on the compliance decision per se but rather on the question
whether different outcomes on the compliance stage have different im-
plications for the subsequent behavior of agents trading in the market
and thus for the efﬁciency of that market.
2. A credence goods game
2.1. Basic framework
We base our experimental investigation on a simpliﬁed version of a
model on expert services by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). In this
two-player sequential-move game, a consumer (c; she) has a problem
θ which is either major and requires a high-quality service, or minor
and requires a low-quality service. While the consumer herself only
knows the ex-ante probability h (1− h) of having the major (minor)
problem, an expert seller (s; he) receives full information about thetype of the consumer's problem. More speciﬁcally, the sequence of the
game is as follows: After observing exogenously given prices pl
(representing the price of a low-quality service) and ph (representing
the price of a high-quality service), with pl b ph, the consumer decides
whether to buy a service from the expert seller or to opt out of themar-
ket. In the former case, a random move by nature (n) determines the
consumer's problem; the seller learns the realization of this random
move (by performing a free diagnosis) and then provides a service of ei-
ther low (l) or high (h) quality. We denote the index of the quality pro-
vided by τ ∈ {l, h}. The high quality service (τ= h) solves both types of
problems, while the low quality service (τ = l) is only sufﬁcient for
minor problems. Let cτ denote the costs of quality τ, and cl b ch. For
the quality he claims to have provided the expert can then charge the as-
sociated price (either pl or ph). We denote the index of the quality
charged for by ι ∈ {l, h}.
Thematerial payoffs in case of an interaction are such that the seller
obtains the price he charged from the consumer and has to bear the
costs for the quality provided, i.e., in the baseline game the seller's proﬁt
is πsb = pι − cτ. For future reference we deﬁne a situation in which the
expert provides the low-quality service and charges for the high-
quality service as overcharging; and we refer to a situation in which
the expert provides the low quality to a consumer who has the major
problem as undertreatment.6 The consumer's payoff in case of an inter-
action depends on whether the provided service solved her problem:
She receives the value V N 0 if the quality was sufﬁcient (τ ∈ {l, h} if
θ = l; and τ = h if θ = h) and zero otherwise; and she has to pay the
price charged by the seller in any case. That is, πcb = V− pι if τ is sufﬁ-
cient, and πcb=−pι if it is not. In case of no interaction both the consum-
er and the expert receive an outside value of o. Fig. 1 presents the
structure of this baseline game, excluding the price announcement
stage.2.2. Tax evasion
Taking the baseline game in Fig. 1 as starting point, we nowmodify it
in two ways to implement a tax evasion framework. More speciﬁcally,
we allow the baseline game to be played either with or without taxes.
In the taxation variant of the game (denoted Γt), the monetary payoffs
of the two agents change to πit= πib− t for i= s, c. For the sake of sim-
plicity, the tax is modeled as a ﬂat payment t imposed on each side of
themarket whenever a transaction takes place nomatter which quality
is provided and which price is charged for the good. In the evasion var-
iant of the game (denoted Γe) thematerial payoffs of the two players de-
pend upon whether tax evasion is detected or not. In the latter case
πie = πib, while in the former case πie = πib − (t+ f), where f is the ﬁne
levied by the tax-authority and i= s, c. Whether tax evasion is detected
or not depends on the realization of an independent random variable,
with the probability of detection being d. The sum of all tax payments
and penalties levied are multiplied with a factor r N 1 and are then
redistributed equally among all market participants in the manner of a
public goods game. To preserve the public good nature of the structure
of material payoffs the factor r is chosen such that the individual return
of contributing is less than one (i.e., r/n b 1, where n is the number of
market participants).
In order to detect a possible relationship between the revealed in-
tention of an agent to pay or to evade taxes and the way she behaves
undertreatment overtreatment
overcharging overcharging
Fig. 1. Structure of the baseline game representing a credence good situation. Note. The term undertreatment refers to providing the low quality to a consumerwho needs the high quality;
overtreatment refers to providing the high quality to a consumer who needs the low quality; and overcharging refers to charging the high price when the low quality has been provided.
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game we introduce a tax-decision stage in which the seller and his
consumer can jointly determine whether they want to play variant
Γe or variant Γt of the market game (see Fig. 2). We accomplish this
by giving the expert and the consumer the possibility of simulta-
neously and independently expressing their willingness to evade
taxes as a binary decision. In what follows the term “tax-dishonest”
is used to indicate that a player revealed the intention to evadeFig. 2. Tax-decision stage. Note. The seller (s) and the buyer (c) simultaneously state whether th
wants to pay taxes, game Γt is played subsequently. If both players want to evade taxes, gametaxes at this stage, while “tax-honest” means that he or she decided
against tax evasion. It is reasonable to assume that no one can be
forced to evade taxes. Therefore, we require that tax evasion needs
a unanimous consent, i.e., taxes are evaded if and only if both parties
of a transaction are tax-dishonest in the tax-decision stage of the
game. After this stage, both agents get to know the tax decision of
the other player and continue with playing either the Γe or the Γt
variant of the market game.eywant to pay taxes (“tax-honest”) or evade taxes (“tax-dishonest”). If at least one player
Γe is played.
18 L. Balafoutas et al. / Journal of Public Economics 129 (2015) 14–25Assuming common knowledge that all agents are risk-neutral and
exclusively interested in their own material payoff and implementing
parameters such that (1− h)V− ph b o, the subgame perfect prediction
for the market game is that in case of a transaction the expert always
provides the low-quality service and charges the price for the high-
quality service. Anticipating this, the consumer opts out of the market.
Expecting that themarketwill remain inactive, both parties of a transac-
tion are indifferent between the two options at the tax-decision stage of
the game.
3. Experimental design
3.1. Experimental treatments
In order to isolate the consequences of different constellations of re-
vealed intentions regarding tax evasion on the behavior of the agents
and to identify the causes for these consequences our experiment in-
volves three treatments implemented in a between-subjects design.
In treatment ENDO (for endogenous) participants are asked to ex-
press their willingness to evade taxes as a binary decision, as described
in the previous section. This is ourmain treatment, theﬁndings ofwhich
we discuss in Section 4. In addition we run two control treatments,
called EXO and SELLER.
In EXO (for exogenous) participants are randomly assigned to either
the Γe or the Γt variant of the game. To control for unobserved factors,
the parameters regarding price vectors, problem types, market condi-
tions (taxed or untaxed), and detected instances of tax evasion are
held constant across EXO and ENDO. This is done by taking the data ob-
served in the ENDO treatment and implementing them exogenously as
experimental parameters in the EXO treatment. We will use treatment
EXO to examine whether differences in the market behavior of trading
partners in different constellations of revealed preferences to evade
taxes are caused by the shift in the market environment itself. It might
be the case, for instance, that subjects behave differently in an environ-
ment where gains from trade are high with high probability and low
with low probability (as it is the case in the Γe variant of the market
game) as compared to an environment where gains are intermediate
with certainty (as it is the case in the Γt variant of the game). In the
Introduction we referred to this as the cake size effect.
In the SELLER treatment the power of deciding about tax evasion is
entirely on the sellers' side, while consumers are not able to express
their intentions regarding tax evasion. This treatment will be used to
gain information about the existence of a selection effect (as discussed
in the Introduction), in particular to shed light on the question whether
tax-dishonest sellers are per se more likely to misbehave in credence
goods markets. Table 1 summarizes our treatments.
3.2. Experimental procedures
At the beginning of each session subjects were randomly assigned to
their ﬁxed role as either a seller or a consumer and they were given an
initial endowment of 200 experimental currency units (ecu), with
100 ecu beingworth 1 euro. In all treatments subjects played 20 periods
in a random stranger design within a matching group of eight partici-
pants, consisting of four sellers and four consumers. The randomTable 1
Experimental treatments.
Treatment Tax evaded if N
ENDO Both are tax-dishonest 80
SELLER Seller is dishonest 88
EXO Exogenously imposed 80stranger design was implemented in order to avoid reputation effects
in the buyer–seller interaction. Although it is true that trading partners
meet more than once on average so that some kind of reputation can
emerge at the group level, subjects can never identify who their current
partner is, thus excluding reputation formation at the individual level.
A consumer's probability of having the major problem was set to
h = 0.5. We decided for equal probabilities of the two problems as
this is particularly simple to explain to subjects and avoids confusion.
The costs for the expert of providing a low-quality service was cl =
20 ecu, the cost of a high-quality service was ch = 40 ecu, and the
value for the consumer of receiving a sufﬁcient quality was V =
120 ecu. This parameter constellation implies relatively large efﬁciency
gains for appropriate treatment and relatively low incentives for
undertreatment (in comparison to the parameter constellation in
Dulleck et al., 2011) and was chosen in the hope of getting relatively
high participation rates and enough room for treatment variation.
Five price vectors (pl, ph) from the set {(50, 60), (50, 70), (50, 80),
(60, 80), (70, 80)} were imposed randomly and with equal frequency.
We decided for variation in prices for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason is
that we wanted to avoid that subjects get annoyed, tired or bored
when facing the same decision situation again and again. The second
reason is to have a variation in material incentives for overcharging
and – for those sellers who charge honestly – for under- and
overtreatment.
The chosen set of price vectors satisﬁes certain desirable proper-
ties. First, it includes all types of price vectors — undertreatment
price vectors [(50, 60) and (70, 80)], equal markup price vectors
[(50, 70) and (60, 80)] and also an overtreatment price vector [(50,
80)]. Undertreatment (overtreatment) price vectors have the
property that an honestly-charging expert has a material incentive
to always provide the low (high) quality because pl − cl N ph − ch
(pl − cl b ph − ch, respectively). With equal markup vectors an
honestly-charging expert has no incentive to provide the wrong
quality, because pl − cl = ph − ch. Second, for the three price
vectors (50, 60), (50, 70) and (50, 80), we ﬁx the price for the low
quality and vary the price for the high quality, while for the three
price vectors (50, 80), (60, 80) and (70, 80) we ﬁx the price of the
high quality and vary the price for the low quality. This allows us to
control for possible effects of changing one price while holding the
other constant. Each of these ﬁve price vectors was played for four
rounds, twice with the consumer having a minor problem and
twice with the consumer having a major problem. The sequence of
(price vector, problem)-pairs was randomized on the individual
expert's level. The outside payment o was set to 5 ecu. With this
value for o, the condition (1 − h)V − ph b o is fulﬁlled for all price
constellations and standard theory predicts a complete market
breakdown for our experimental market game.
Roughly in linewith the audit probabilities for non-business individ-
ual returns and corporate returns in the US (cf. IRS, 2011) we set the
probability of an untaxed transaction being detected to 2% (d= 0.02).
To keep things simple in the experiment, the tax t aswell as the penalty
fwas set to 10 ecu. All taxes and penalties were contributed to a public
account with an efﬁciency factor of 2, i.e., all payments were doubled
and equally distributed among the members of a matching group, im-
plying a marginal per capita return of 0.25. Payments from the public
good were only revealed at the end of the experiment.
At the outset of each session, participants were given plenty of time
to read through the instructions (those for treatment ENDO are given in
the Appendix A). Afterwards, the instructions were also read out aloud.
The experiment was framed as a decision about tax evasion (and about
problems and solutions in a market with buyers and sellers) in order to
induce the underlying tax context rather than letting participants
choose between abstract lotteries without context. Before the start of
the experiment, each participant had to answer a set of control ques-
tions and the experiment did not continue until all participants had an-
swered all questions correctly. To get the same number of data points
Table 2
Market behavior in treatments ENDO, EXO, and SELLER.
Situation Seller Consumer Cond. Freq. UR OR IR EFF
Panel (a): ENDO
A (ENDO) t-Seller t-Consumer Γt 0.17 0.43 0.93 0.85 0.48
B (ENDO) t-Seller e-Consumer Γt 0.20 0.58 0.91 0.67 0.28
C (ENDO) e-Seller t-Consumer Γt 0.26 0.65 0.91 0.64 0.23
D (ENDO) e-Seller e-Consumer Γe 0.37 0.57 0.98 0.74 0.32
Panel (b): SELLER
E (SELLER) t-Seller n/a Γt 0.36 0.56 0.88 0.68 0.30
F (SELLER) e-SELLER n/a Γe 0.64 0.70 0.97 0.59 0.18
Panel (c): EXO
G (EXO) Tax paid exogenously Γt 0.63 0.59 0.92 0.71 0.29
H (EXO) Tax evaded exogenously Γe 0.37 0.62 0.92 0.72 0.27
Notes. Market behavior after different outcomes of the tax-decision stage. UR (OR) repre-
sents the undertreatment (overcharging) rate and IR the interaction rate. ‘freq.’ represents
the frequency of occurrence of a certain situation, ‘cond.’ the resulting market condition
(taxed or untaxed), and ‘EFF’ the resulting market efﬁciency calculated as IR∙(1-UR).
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ing decision after he received information about the tax attitude of his
consumer but before he received information about the consumer's in-
teraction decision.7
We concluded each sessionwith a test eliciting each subject's risk at-
titudes—which could be an important factor driving tax evadingbehav-
ior. Each subject was exposed to a series of 10 binary choices between a
cash gamble and a safe payoff. While the cash gamble remained the
same in all choices – it always yielded either 500 ecu or 0 ecu, each
with 50% probability – the safe payoff increased in steps of 50 ecu
from 50 ecu to 500 ecu. The 10 binary choices were presented to the
subjects one-at-a-time in random order (i.e., each binary decision on
an own screen). With the choice data we constructed a variable (called
risk factor) deﬁned as the number of times a subject opted for the risky
lottery,with higher values thus corresponding to a higherwillingness to
take risks.8
The experiment was conducted computerized at the University of
Innsbruck using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total 248 students participated, 80 in
each of the treatments ENDO and EXO and 88 in treatment SELLER. Ses-
sions lasted for about 75min and average earningswere about 11 euros.
Each subject took part in only one session and we excluded subjects
with prior experience in credence goods games and tax experiments.
4. Results in ENDO
In what follows we deﬁne “e-sellers” as sellers who revealed the in-
tention to evade taxes and “t-sellers” as sellers who revealed the inten-
tion to pay the tax, and apply the analogous deﬁnitions for consumers.
Wewill refer to the pool of sellers and buyerswho revealed a preference
for paying (evading) the tax as “t-agents” (“e-agents”). For future refer-
ence we also deﬁne the following variables:
• The tax-dishonesty rate is the relative frequency of cases where sub-
jects revealed the intention to evade taxes.
• The interaction rate (IR) is the relative frequency of consumers choos-
ing to enter the market.
• The undertreatment rate (UR) is the ratio of cases where the seller
chose to provide the low-quality service to a consumer having the
major problem to all cases where the consumer has the major
problem.
• The overcharging rate (OR) is the ratio of cases where the seller
charged for the high-quality service while providing the low-quality
service to all cases where a low-quality service was provided.9
• Market efﬁciency is deﬁned as IR (1− UR), which allows comparing
market performance after different outcomes of the tax-decision7 Since the strategymethod is not used to elicit a seller's provision and charging behav-
ior contingent on the tax decision of the trading partner (which is the main focus of this
work) but only for the participation decision, experimenter demand effects or similar ob-
jections related to the validity of the strategy method are arguably less of an issue in our
design. For discussions of the pros and cons of using the strategymethod see, for instance,
Casari and Cason (2009), or Brandts and Charness (2011).
8 This measure of risk attitudes (which is similar to the one used by Holt and Laury,
2002) is problematic for subjects whomake inconsistent choices (by switchingmore than
once, switching in the wrong direction or choosing the gamble when it is ﬁrst-order sto-
chastically dominated). In our experiment only a small minority of subjects (6.45% of
our sample) made inconsistent choices in the risk elicitation task. We have checked and
conﬁrmed the robustness of our main results by running versions of our regressions in
which we excluded the inconsistent subjects.
9 It is important to note that the categories undertreatment and overcharging are notmu-
tually exclusive. The category overcharging, in fact, comprises different forms of fraudulent
behavior: fraudwhere there is “overcharging only” (that is, caseswhere the expert appro-
priately provides the low quality to a consumer who has the minor problem, but charges
the high price for the low quality); and fraud where there is “overcharging and
undertreatment” (that is, cases where the expert inappropriately provides the low quality
to a consumer who has the major problem and in addition charges the high price for the
low quality).stage of the game. Note that this expression represents the likelihood
that the customer's problem is ﬁxed and the value of V = 120 is
created in a given matching — for this to happen the customer must
interact and he must not be undertreated.
The focus of our interest lies in the consequences of different con-
stellations of revealed intentions to pay or evade taxes in treatment
ENDO on the subsequent behavior in the credence goods market. We
therefore ﬁrst report the results of this treatment and postpone the dis-
cussion of the two control treatments to the next section. As a reminder,
the agreement of both trading partners was required to conduct tax
evasion in treatment ENDO. Accordingly, we will refer to attempted tax
evasion when one of the agents revealed the intention to evade taxes
but the other did not, and we will refer to actual tax evasion when
both agents revealed the intention to evade taxes so that the tax was
not paid.
Table 2 reports the undertreatment and overcharging rates
(i.e., provision and charging decisions by expert sellers) aswell as inter-
action rates (i.e., entry decisions by consumers) and overall market efﬁ-
ciency, broken down by treatment and by conﬁguration of agent
types.10 As is clear from the table, the benchmark prediction of an inac-
tive market (corresponding to an interaction rate of 0%) – and of an
undertreatment and an overcharging rate of 100% in case of interaction
– fails largely. The interaction rate is well above 50% in all the situations
listed in the table and the undertreatment rate is between 43% (in situ-
ation A) and 70% (in situation F). The only variable that is roughly in line
with the benchmark prediction is the overcharging rate — it varies be-
tween 88% in Situation E and 98% in Situation D and is therewith not
far from the predicted 100%.
Comparing undertreatment and overcharging rates in the different
situations reveals that the latter are much larger than the former in
each row. This is in line with the ﬁndings in related experiments (see
Dulleck et al., 2011, or Beck et al., 2013, for instance).11 There are several
possible explanations for this ﬁnding. An important one is based on the
observation that undertreatment necessarily involves an efﬁciency loss10 Table 2 does not report the results for overtreatment, given that overtreatment is cost-
ly from the seller's point of view and does not create any value for the consumer. As it
turns out, overtreatment rates were indeed extremely low in all treatments and occurred
overall in just 2.4% of cases with a minor problem.
11 Among the 16 treatments investigated in Dulleck et al. (2011), the B/N constellation is
closest to our credence goods game in terms of institutional and informational framework.
For this treatment the authors report an undertreatment rate of 53% which is roughly in
line with our results in Table 2. The overcharging rate is with 88% somewhat lower than
in our experiment. A possible reason is that we provided an example in the instructions
that features overcharging, while Dulleck et al. had no such example. In hindsight provid-
ing such an example was not a good idea because the observed high overcharging rates
make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant differences across situations.
Table 3
Undertreatment rates and interaction rates, treatment ENDO.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
variable
Undertreatment Undertreatment Interaction Interaction
Used data t-Sellers e-Sellers t-Consumers e-Consumers
Meeting an
e-seller
−0.220⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
0.080
(0.064)
Meeting an
e-consumer
0.191⁎
(0.107)
−0.099
(0.097)
pl 0.008
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
0.007⁎
(0.004)
−0.007⁎⁎
(0.004)
ph −0.007
(0.007)
−0.008⁎
(0.005)
−0.016⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.009⁎
(0.005)
Period 0.032⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
0.011⁎⁎
(0.004)
−0.017⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
−0.008⁎
(0.004)
Female −0.075
(0.020)
0.047
(0.130)
−0.118⁎⁎
(0.063)
0.003
(0.055)
Age −0.031
(0.019)
−0.029
(0.018)
−0.006
(0.013)
−0.001
(0.008)
Risk factor −0.010
(0.068)
−0.055
(0.076)
0.012
(0.036)
0.028
(0.025)
Observations 154 246 343 457
Notes. Probit regressions,marginal effects. Standard errors are inparentheses, clusteredby
matching group.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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(1:1) transfer ofmoney from the customer to the expert. Thus, for an ex-
pert not to have an incentive to overcharge, the material payoff of the
customer must receive at least the same weight in the expert's utility
function as the expert's ownmaterial payoff—which is quite a demand-
ing requirement. By contrast, undertreatment involves a transfer of
money from the customer to the expert that is associated with an
efﬁciency loss: If an expert seller undertreats his customer then his ma-
terial payoff increases by ch − cl, while the payoff of the customer de-
creases by V N ch − cl. An implication is that a weight of [(ch − cl)/
V] b 1 on the payoff of the customer is sufﬁcient to prevent
undertreatment, which is less demanding. A second explanation is
based on the observation that undertreatment is observable with cer-
tainty by the customer, while overcharging is not (except for the case
where it comes togetherwith undertreatment). This is an important dif-
ference from the point of view of the expert, because the moral cost of
fraudulent behavior is likely to be higher if the expert expects that the
customer will realize ex post that she has been cheated, compared to
a situation where the expert knows that the customer can never be
sure whether a high price is due to overcharging or to nature having
chosen the major problem.12
In discussing the effects of attempted and actual tax evasion onmar-
ket outcomes we will proceed in reverse chronological order, following
the logic of backwards induction:Wediscuss theprovision and charging
behavior of sellers in Subsection 4.1, the participation decision of con-
sumers in 4.2, the overall market efﬁciency in 4.3 and the tax evasion
decisions in 4.4.4.1. The market game: undertreatment and overcharging
We begin by analyzing the effects of attempted and actual tax eva-
sion onmarket outcomes and take a situation with two t-agents (Situa-
tion A in Table 2) as a reference. Situations B and C refer to attempted
tax evasion by one of the two agents, while Situation D leads to actual
tax evasion. Panel (a) of Table 2 reveals that the provision behavior of
expert sellers ismost honestwhen both agents have revealed their will-
ingness to pay taxes in the tax-decision stage (Situation A). Here, the
undertreatment rate of 0.43 is lower than in all other situations (and
this value is signiﬁcantly different from the corresponding values in B
and in D, with p b 0.05 for each comparison).13 When being matched
with an e-consumer, a t-seller on average signiﬁcantly increases the
UR from 0.43 to 0.58, while an e-seller decreases the UR from 0.65 to
0.57. However, this latter drop in UR is not signiﬁcant. Also, comparing
undertreatment in the cases where a seller and a consumer have agreed
on evading the tax (Situation D) with the other situations reveals that
undertreatment rates in Situation D do not differ signiﬁcantly from
those in situations B and C (p N 0.8), but are signiﬁcantly higher than
those in dyads in which both subjects were tax-honest (p= 0.01).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 formally test the consequences of
interacting with an e-consumer for the two types of sellers.14 Column
(1) indicates that tax-dishonest consumers have to be prepared for a
(weakly) signiﬁcantly higher probability of undertreatment thanhonest12 Such a difference in the moral cost is predicted, for instance, by the ‘guilt-of-blame’
variant of the guilt-aversion model of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). For the present
context this variant of the theory predicts that an expert cares about the customer's ex
post inference regarding the extent to which hewas willing to let her payoff expectations
down. See Beck et al. (2013) for an application of the guilt aversion model to a credence
goods context.
13 In order to control for the fact that observationswithin amatching group of eight par-
ticipants are not independent of each other, all subsequent statistical p-values are based
on two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests based on matching group averages across all
twenty periods (unless stated otherwise).
14 In this and in all subsequent regressions, standard errors are clustered by matching
group in order to control for interdependencies within each group.ones when the interaction partner is an honest seller. By contrast, tax-
dishonest sellers treat e- and t-consumers more or less the same, as
can be seen in Column (2).
Result 1. Undertreatment rates are lowest when both agents have
opted for paying the tax in the ﬁrst stage. Tax-dishonest consumers
face signiﬁcantly more undertreatment than tax-honest ones when
interacting with an honest seller. Tax-dishonest sellers treat both
types of consumers alike.
Overcharging does not result in any changes in efﬁciency since it is
only a matter of redistribution. Table 2 shows that overcharging rates
are very high across the board, which leaves little room for signiﬁcant
treatment differences in this fraud dimension. It is still worthwhile not-
ing that overcharging is most frequent when two e-agents interact (Sit-
uation D), but the only statistically signiﬁcant difference is between
situations D and C (p b 0.05).
Result 2. We observe only small differences in overcharging rates be-
tween different types of interacting dyads. The highest overcharging
rates occur in the interaction of two tax-dishonest agents.
We conclude this subsection with a word on actual tax evasion,
i.e., the case in which both agents are tax-dishonest and the transaction
goes untaxed. Pooling situations A to C and comparing them with D al-
lows us to address the question whether behavior differs in conditions
Γe and Γt — or, put differently, to evaluate the impact of actual tax eva-
sion. There is no signiﬁcant difference in undertreatment rates
(p N 0.16) between taxed and untaxed markets, while there is a signiﬁ-
cant difference in overcharging rates (p = 0.02). The result for the
undertreatment rate is perhaps not surprising since we have argued
that attempted tax evasion is already enough to increase misbehavior
by sellers compared to mutual tax honesty. When, in addition to
attempted tax evasion, actual tax evasion occurs, undertreatment does
not increase further because it is already at a high level and also because
pairs of tax-dishonest agents tend to display slightly lower
undertreatment rates than pairs of differently-minded agents. We will
return to this point in Section 5.
tax-dishonest decisions within 20 rounds
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Fig. 3. Tax-dishonest decisions per subject in ENDO. Note. Black (gray) bars indicate sellers
(consumers).
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Turning to the consumer's participation decision, a close look at the
relevant column of Table 2 reveals that the interaction rate (IR) of 0.85
in Situation A is signiﬁcantly higher than in all other situations (p b 0.05
for all pairwise comparisons). Furthermore, consumers differentiate be-
tween t-sellers and e-sellers and condition their interaction behavior on
the tax decision of the seller. t-Consumers, in particular, are muchmore
willing to enter the market if they are interacting with a t-seller
than with an e-seller, increasing their IR from 0.64 to 0.85 (p b 0.05).
e-Consumers also take their tradingpartner's tax decision into consider-
ation, however here the effect ofmeeting a dishonest seller runs into the
opposite direction. Comparing Situation B, in which e-consumers
meet t-sellers, with Situation D, in which they meet e-sellers, reveals
that e-consumers weakly signiﬁcantly increase their interaction rate
by 7 percentage points when being matched with an e-seller (p b 0.1).
These results on consumer behavior are qualitatively conﬁrmed by
regressions (3) and (4) of Table 3, which explain the interaction deci-
sion of consumers by means of an array of factors, including the tax
decision of the seller. To receive more detailed information we ran
separate regressions for t- and e-consumers. The dummy for meeting
a tax-dishonest seller shows up with signs in line with the qualitative
differences from Table 2 for both types of consumers, again suggesting
that t-consumers decrease and e-consumers increase their interaction
rates as a response to meeting an e-seller. This effect is signiﬁcant only
for tax-honest consumers and it has a large negative coefﬁcient of
−0.22, mirroring the pronounced differences in interaction rates seen
in Table 2. The other factors inﬂuencing the probability of interaction
have the expected signs: Interaction probabilities decrease in ph sug-
gesting that both t-consumers and e-consumers anticipate that a higher
price for the high-quality service increases the incentives for sellers to
overcharge consumers. The effects of the price for the low-quality ser-
vice are of opposite signs for t-consumers and e-consumers, and they
are smaller in magnitude. The trend towards more selﬁsh behavior of
sellers indicated by Fig. 4 below results in a reduction of interaction fre-
quencies over time, as indicated by the period-dummy in Table 2.
Result 3. Tax-honest consumers decrease their interaction rates
signiﬁcantly when they meet a tax-dishonest seller. Tax-dishonest
consumers react in the opposite direction, but this effect is not
signiﬁcant.
4.3. The market game: overall efﬁciency
Combining the interaction and undertreatment rates in different
situations to measure market efﬁciency, deﬁned as IR(1 − UR), we
are able to investigate the efﬁciency loss that arises in the underlying
market for credence goods as a consequence of attempted and actual
tax evasion. As suggested by the results on undertreatment and in-
teraction rates, efﬁciency is (with 0.48) highest in dyads with two
tax-honest agents (Situation A in Table 2). This impression is
conﬁrmed by statistical tests: We ﬁnd that efﬁciency in all other
situations is signiﬁcantly lower (p b 0.05) than in Situation A. All de-
viations from perfect honesty to attempted or successful tax evasion
hence lead to a drop in efﬁciency of considerable magnitude, ranging
from a drop by one third in Situation D to a drop by more than 50% in
Situation C.
Result 4. Market efﬁciency is highest when both agents are tax-honest,
but decreases signiﬁcantly when at least one of the agents has revealed
the intention to evade the tax. Attempted tax evasion is thus enough to
lead to large efﬁciency losses.
Whenever tax evasion was attempted (and regardless of whether it
was in fact realized through mutual agreement), the market sufferedfrom severe efﬁciency losses caused by a combination of an increase
in the undertreatment rate and a decrease in the interaction frequency.
Pooling situations A to C and comparing them with D reveals the
efﬁciency impact of actual tax evasion. The similarity of overall
undertreatment and interaction rates in market conditions Γe and Γt re-
sults in no signiﬁcant difference in efﬁciency between the two market
conditions (p N 0.24), although the difference is in the expected direc-
tion and is of quite substantial magnitude. Again, this is not really sur-
prising since we have argued that attempted tax evasion is enough to
reduce efﬁciency compared to mutual tax honesty.4.4. The tax-decision stage: revealed intentions to evade taxes
Overall, in 60% of cases subjects were tax-dishonest, resulting in a
total tax evasion rate of 37% (given that the consent of both tradingpart-
ners is required for actual tax evasion). Tax (dis)honesty is a deliberate
and consistent decision for most subjects: 84% of subjects can be classi-
ﬁed as either being regularly tax honest (with tax-honesty rates of three
quarters or more) or regularly tax-dishonest (with tax-honesty rates of
onequarter or less). Fig. 3 reports the distribution of relative frequencies
of subjects' tax decisions, broken down by sellers and consumers. A Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov test for equality in distributions shows no signiﬁcant
difference in tax-honesty of sellers and consumers (p = 0.16), even
though, on average, sellers opt more often for tax evasion than con-
sumers (63 vs. 57% of all decisions). At any rate, both distributions are
clearly far from random (p b 0.01, binomial tests), suggesting that
agents expect to interact in the market later on with positive probabili-
ty. To get an impression ofwhether behavior is also stable over time, the
black dashed line in Fig. 4 depicts the smoothed tax-dishonesty rate
over all periods, and exhibits a slight upward trend.
To get more information on the drivers of behavior in the tax-
decision stage of the game we run a probit regression as shown in
Table 4. It explains revealed intentions to evade taxes in treatment
ENDO by means of the participant type (seller or consumer), the two
prices, the period, and idiosyncratic controls for gender, age, and risk at-
titudes. Contrary to the results of the non-parametric statistical test, the
regression picks up a weakly signiﬁcant difference between participant
types, with sellers being about 12 percentage points more likely than
buyers to opt for tax evasion, ceteris paribus. Similar to previous studies
such as Baldry (1987) and Bayer and Sutter (2009) we also ﬁnd a signif-
icant effect of gender on the probability of tax evasion, with females
exhibiting a lower propensity to be tax-dishonest. Risk attitude shows
up insigniﬁcantly, implying that we do not ﬁnd any evidence that risk
attitudes are important for tax-honesty in the tax-decision stage. More-
over, the prices ph and pl are insigniﬁcant.
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Fig. 4. Behavior over time in treatment ENDO. Note. Smoothed by calculating 3-period
moving averages.
Table 5
Undertreatment, overcharging and interaction rates, all treatments.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent
variable
Undertreatment Overcharging Interaction
pl 0.003
(0.002)
−0.004⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
ph −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
Period 0.009⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.003⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
−0.013⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
Female 0.014 0.027 0.007
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In the previous section we have seen that market behavior in our
main treatment differs remarkably between the four constellations of
revealed intentions to evade taxes (i.e., between situations A–D in
Table 2). However, within the ENDO treatment it was impossible to dis-
criminate between the various effects that might be responsible for the
differences.
For instance, we found that the undertreatment rate is only 43% in
Situation A, while it is 15 percentage points higher in Situation B
(with 58%). Thisﬁnding is consistentwith the existence of a solidarity ef-
fect which predicts that tax-honest sellers treat tax-honest customers
better than tax-dishonest ones. However, the punishment effectmakes
exactly the same prediction regarding this comparison. This is not an ac-
cident— to the contrary, within the ENDO treatment the solidarity and
conspiracy effect on the one hand, and the punishment effect on the
other, are simply two sides of the same coin: Solidarity and conspiracy
predict better performance in ‘symmetric situations’ (i.e., in A and in
D), while punishment predicts worse performance in ‘asymmetric situ-
ations’ (i.e., in B and in C).
As a second example consider the ﬁnding that the undertreatment
rate is signiﬁcantly lower in A (where both parties are tax-honest)
than inD (where both are tax-dishonest). This ﬁnding could be attribut-
ed to the solidarity effect (one would have to argue that it is strongerTable 4
Tax decisions, treatment ENDO.
Dependent variable Tax-dishonesty
Seller 0.122⁎
(0.075)
pl 0.001
(0.001)
ph −0.001
(0.001)
Period 0.002
(0.003)
Female −0.214⁎⁎
(0.084)
Age 0.010
(0.011)
Risk factor −0.021
(0.035)
Observations 1600
Notes. Probit regressions, marginal effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered by matching group.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.than the conspiracy effect), to the selection effect (which predicts that
more pro-social sellers are not only less inclined to evade taxes but
also less willing to defraud consumers), to the cake-size effect (one
would have to argue that sellers behave in a more consumer-friendly
way in an environment where earnings are intermediate with certainty
than in the alternative scenario where gains from trade are high with
high probability and low with low probability), or to any combination
of those effects.
To receive information about the relative importance of the various
effects for our ﬁndings wewill exploit the two control treatments, SELL-
ER and EXO. Panels (b) and (c) in Table 2 report the key variables for
those treatments, and Table 5 shows regressions with undertreatment,
overcharging and interaction rates as dependent variables and with
the seven situations of Table 2 as independent variables (with Situation
A as the left-out category).
First we search for evidence of a cake size effect. This effect could be
responsible for differences between the untaxed Situation D and all
other (taxed) situations in ENDO. The hypothesis would be that behav-
ior differs between markets Γe and Γt due to the sheer change in proﬁts
and their probabilities, no matter how tax evasion has come about (in
case it has). To check for the existence of a cake size effect we use our
EXO treatment where – by design – the solidarity, conspiracy, punish-
ment and selection effects cannot play any role, while the cake size
effect is potentially present. Speciﬁcally, we compare Situation G to Sit-
uation H. We ﬁnd only small differences in the provision and charging
decisions of sellers across the two market situations. The overcharging
rate is practically identical in G and H. The undertreatment rate in-
creases slightly from 0.59 in taxed markets to 0.62 in untaxed markets.
This difference is insigniﬁcant based on an F-test (Situation G = Situa-
tion H, post-estimation based on column 1 of Table 5) but it does
show up as signiﬁcant based on a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (p b
0.05). Accordingly, we conclude by stating that we ﬁnd some limited(0.066) (0.024) (0.028)
Age −0.018
(0.012)
0.000
(0.002)
−0.009⁎
(0.005)
Risk factor −0.005
(0.028)
−0.000
(0.007)
0.018
(0.013)
Situation B 0.160⁎
(0.082)
−0.007
(0.031)
−0.240⁎⁎⁎
(0.068)
Situation C 0.193⁎
(0.086)
0.001
(0.038)
−0.238⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
Situation D 0.120⁎
(0.063)
0.044⁎⁎
(0.016)
−0.145⁎⁎
(0.071)
Situation E 0.148⁎
(0.077)
−0.035
(0.053)
−0.193⁎*
(0.090)
Situation F 0.268⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
0.038
(0.023)
−0.292⁎⁎⁎
(0.082)
Situation G 0.171⁎⁎⁎
(0.044)
0.006
(0.031)
−0.170⁎⁎
(0.083)
Situation H 0.176⁎
(0.079)
−0.003
(0.035)
−0.174⁎
(0.097)
Observations 1240 1962 2480
Notes. Probit regressions,marginal effects. Standard errors are inparentheses, clusteredby
matching group.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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cake size effect in the charging decisions of sellers.
So far, we cannot disentangle the selection effect – i.e., the effect of
self-selection by sellers into the underground economy – from the reac-
tion of a seller to a consumer's tax decision, meaning that we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that tax-evading sellers are per se more likely to
undertake fraudulent behavior regardless of the tax attitude of con-
sumers. To check for the presence of a selection effect (on top of the
cake size effect) we use our SELLER treatment where by design the sol-
idarity, conspiracy and punishment effects cannot play any role, while
the selection and the cake size effect are potentially present. Speciﬁcally,
we compare Situation E in Table 2 (where the seller has self-selected
into the taxed economy) to Situation G (where the seller was randomly
assigned to the taxed economy) and Situation F (where the seller has
self-selected into theuntaxed economy) to SituationH (where the seller
was randomly assigned to the untaxed economy). Selection predicts
higher undertreatment and overcharging rates in G than in E and in F
than in H. Indeed, all four comparisons (two comparisons for each of
the two fraud dimensions) are qualitatively in line with seller selec-
tion — undertreatment, for instance, is much higher among e-sellers
in SELLER than under exogenously imposed tax evasion (70% vs. 62%).
In terms of the relevant F-tests in Table 5, the differences are generally
insigniﬁcant with the notable exception of signiﬁcantly higher
overcharging rates in situation F than in H (97% vs. 92; p b 0.05, F-test
based on Column 2 of Table 5).15 This indicates that those sellers who
self-select into the untaxed economy may be more likely to overcharge
their customers.
The solidarity effect and the conspiracy effect refer to the possibility
that sellers may reserve better treatment for consumers of the same
type. As we have deﬁned those terms in the Introduction, solidarity
may drive behavior in the relationship between t-sellers and t-
consumers, while conspiracy might be relevant in the interaction be-
tween e-sellers and e-consumers, and both can alternatively be thought
of as in-group favoritism. To check for the existence of a solidarity or a
conspiracy effect we compare Situation A from treatment ENDO to Situ-
ation E from treatment SELLER and Situation D from treatment ENDO to
Situation F from treatment SELLER. Solidarity between two tax-honest
agents predicts that sellers cheat less in A than in E, because in A they
are matched with a consumer of the same type, whereas in E nothing
is known about the type of the consumer. For the same reason, conspir-
acy between two tax-dishonest agents predicts that undertreatment
and overcharging will be less common in D than in F (where nothing
is known about the consumer's type).
It is important to note that our identiﬁcation strategy here is based
on the implicit assumption that selection is the same across the ENDO
and the SELLER treatment. This is not necessarily the case, as the impli-
cations of choosing to evade for a seller are different across the two
conditions and, as such, could imply different selection processes. Spe-
ciﬁcally, a seller evading in SELLER realizes the beneﬁts of evasion with
certainty (he does not have to pay the taxes for sure), while this is not
the case in ENDO (as here evasion takes place only if the buyer agrees).
This limitation of our identiﬁcation strategy should be kept in mind
when interpreting our results.
While we have seen that overcharging frequencies are almost at
a corner in every situation – and in this case higher in D than in F, con-
trary to the conspiracy hypothesis – the qualitative differences for
undertreatment are fully in line with the existence of both a solidarity
and a conspiracy effect. Undertreatment is less common in A than in E
and in D than in F. Based on Column 1 of Table 5, both F-tests (Situation
A= Situation E, respectively Situation D= Situation F) point to weakly
signiﬁcant differences (p b 0.1).15 This difference, however, is not signiﬁcant with non-parametric testing (p N 0.1,
Mann–Whitney test based on matching group averages). All other differences between
situations E and G, respectively F and H, are also insigniﬁcant based on Mann–Whitney
tests, in line with the regression results reported here.The punishment effect predicts that fraud is more prevalent in situa-
tions where the seller knows he is matchedwith someone of a different
tax attitude than in situations where he does not have this information.
To check for the existence of a punishment effect we compare Situation
B from treatment ENDO to Situation E from treatment SELLER and Situ-
ation C from treatment ENDO to Situation F from treatment SELLER.
Here we exploit the fact that the cake size effect was found to be of
minor importance and we assume again that selection is the same
across the ENDO and the SELLER treatment (which is not necessarily
the case – as indicated above). Punishment then predicts more
consumer-friendly behavior in E than in B (where the seller knows
that the consumer is of a different type) and more consumer-friendly
behavior in F than in C (for the same reason). The corresponding differ-
ences in undertreatment and overcharging rates are either very small or
in the “wrong” direction (such as the comparison between the 65%
undertreatment rate in C and the 70% UR in F) and the F-tests in
Table 5 show that the differences are always insigniﬁcant. Hence, we
ﬁnd no evidence to support the presence of a punishment effect in our
experiment. We summarize the ﬁndings of this section as:
Result 5. We ﬁnd evidence for the existence of a solidarity effect be-
tween two tax-honest agents and a conspiracy effect between two
tax-dishonest agents, leading to less fraud when agents reveal the
same tax attitude. We also ﬁnd some evidence for the existence of a se-
lection effect, with tax-dishonest sellers beingmore likely to overcharge
their customers, but almost no evidence for the existence of a punish-
ment effect or a cake size effect.
In this section's analysis we have so farmainly dealt with the various
effects driving the provision and charging behavior of sellers, while re-
maining silent about the behavior of consumers and the resulting inter-
action rates. The reason is that our design does not allow us to cleanly
identify the relative roles of the many effects that might be driving the
decision to enter themarket or not. In particular, entry decisions by con-
sumers can be driven by a solidarity, a conspiracy, a punishment or a
cake-size effect, but also by the consumer's expectation of (some of)
these effects affecting their partners as sellers. To give an example of
this, let us compare the interaction rates in situations A and C. The fact
that interaction is much more frequent in A than in C may be driven
by a solidarity effect (t-consumers reward t-sellers' tax-honesty in A
by increasing their propensity to enter themarket), a punishment effect
(t-consumers punish e-sellers' tax-dishonesty in C by decreasing their
propensity to enter), or an anticipation of a number of different things:
Anticipation of less (more) fraud by the seller in A (in C) due to the sol-
idarity (punishment) effect on the seller's side, or anticipation of more
fraud in C due to the perceived selection effect — in this latter case,
the consumer perceives the seller's tax evasion decision as a signal of
his preferences and of the resulting provision and charging behavior.
Similarly, the higher interaction rate in D than in B may be driven by
the conspiracy effect, the punishment effect, or by the consumer's antic-
ipation (e.g., if consumers hope for better treatment in D due to conspir-
acy from the seller).
Our controls are of limited help in disentangling those effects. For in-
stance, following the line of argument that we used for undertreatment,
solidarity predicts higher interaction rates in A than in E and conspiracy
predicts higher interaction in D than in F. We do ﬁnd signiﬁcant differ-
ences in both of these comparisons (p b 0.05; F-tests based on column
3 of Table 5), which is consistent with the existence of a solidarity and
a conspiracy effect in the consumers' interaction decisions. At the
same time, however, consumers may interact more frequently in A
and in D because they expect the seller to be driven by the solidarity
or the conspiracy effect in these situations. This issue could potentially
be addressed by eliciting consumers' beliefs about the behavior of the
seller or by running a number of additional control treatments. Given
that themain focus of our paper is on the interplay between revealed in-
tentions to pay or evade taxes and provision and charging behavior in
24 L. Balafoutas et al. / Journal of Public Economics 129 (2015) 14–25the underlying credence goods market, we leave this an open question
for future research.
6. Conclusion
The channels through which tax evasion can be detrimental to wel-
fare are intricate.We have experimentally investigated the effects of re-
vealed intentions to pay or evade taxes on the performance of a
particular kind of market that is prone to inefﬁciencies in trade. Partici-
pants in a credence goods market were given the opportunity to reveal
their intentions regarding tax evasion before the actual transaction took
place. Onlywhen both the seller and the consumer opted for tax evasion
was the transaction actually concealed from the tax authority.
We are contributing to the literature on tax evasion by demonstrat-
ing that the phenomenon is detrimental not only because it yields an
unfair distribution of the overall tax burden,wastes resourceswhen tax-
payers try to conceal and tax authorities try to detect tax evasion, im-
poses uncertainty on risk-averse evaders and distorts competition, but
also because of its negative impact on the efﬁciency of interaction in
the underlying market. In transactions in which at least one partner
was tax-dishonest, efﬁciency was up to 50% lower than in a constella-
tion with exclusively tax-honest agents. This difference is driven by
higher undertreatment frequencies and lower interaction rates in mar-
kets in which tax evasion was attempted or successfully conducted.We
found that the efﬁciency drop in untaxed markets is hardly driven by
the change in market conditions. Rather, efﬁciency losses arise mainly
due to the fact that subjects who prefer to pay taxes react negatively
to the intent of a tradingpartner to evade themby an increased frequen-
cy of undertreatment (in the case of sellers) and a decreased frequency
of interaction (in the case of consumers). This is in line with our initial
conjecture about the existence of a solidarity effect between two tax-
honest agents that seems to reduce the undertreatment rate and
increase the interaction rate in pairs of tax-honest market participants.
Although we also ﬁnd evidence for a conspiracy effect between two
tax-dishonest agents, which ceteris paribus would lead to more
consumer-friendly behavior in the underground sector, consumers do
not really proﬁt from that effect because it is almost entirely canceled
out by a selection effect that causes more selﬁsh sellers to self-select
into the underground sector.
While our work provides a ﬁrst indication of the presence of hidden
costs of tax evasion, the empirical importance of these costs should be
substantiated in future lab and ﬁeld experiments, perhaps under varia-
tions in the institutional setup. Our ﬁndings so far suggest that con-
sumers are well advised to be cautious of proposing to evade taxes in
situations in which a seller has an informational advantage over the
consumer. If the seller is tax-honest then he might treat the consumer
worse because he has less scruple to defraud a tax-dishonest than a
tax-honest consumer, due to the fact that he does not identify himself
with a tax-dishonest person. In this case, proposing tax evasion leads
to deteriorated service without any compensating beneﬁt (given that
tax evasion requires mutual consent). In the alternative case where
the seller agrees to conceal the transaction, themyopic gain of the evad-
ed tax may easily be canceled out by the deteriorated service provision
resulting from the fact that a tax-dishonest seller is more likely to com-
mit fraud in the ﬁrst place. This latter statement is supported by our
ﬁnding that selﬁsh sellers tend to self-select into the shadow economy.
So, before agreeing to a transaction, it seems advisable for a consumer to
try to elicit the tax attitude of the seller who has the power to commit
fraud and to abstain from a purchase if she discovers on the seller's
side an intention to evade taxes.
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